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Summary
The idea of a guaranteed income has a long
and respectable history in Canadian political
and economic thought. Recently, in the face of
both wide criticism of the Canadian income security system and growing recognition of the
unacceptability of current poverty rates, there
has been a resurgence in calls for implementation of a Canadian guaranteed income. But the
idea is a controversial one; progressive activists, academics, and politicians disagree about
the desirability and the practicality of a guaranteed income.
This report:
• Traces the history of guaranteed income
proposals in Canada;
• Catalogues both the most common reasons
supporting advocacy of a guaranteed
income and the most telling concerns
raised by the notion;
• Provides an overview of basic dimensions
along which proposals for a guaranteed
income differ and sets out models that
capture much of the range of proposals in
the current debate; and

• Suggests a number of other social
welfare measures that should be central
elements of any reform program, but that
guaranteed income debates often ignore.
The term “guaranteed income” refers to a specific although broad category of social reform.
As a starting place for discussion, the idea of a
guaranteed income is used to signal reform proposals that advocate some variant of an income
benefit scheme in which the state provides a
minimum level of basic income on a continuing basis to every adult, irrespective of personal
circumstances or need, with no or very few conditions attached.
Proponents of a guaranteed income cite a
range of reasons supporting the idea:
• A fix to poverty;
• Liberty and individual opportunity;
• Social and democratic citizenship;
• Gender equality;
• Shared social ownership;
• A flexible and just labour market; and
• Environmental sustainability.
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No single overview model is representative of all
proposals for a guaranteed income. Academic
and political writing on the idea is vast. Three
working models of guaranteed income proposals
illustrate the range of proposals across the four
criteria of universality, conditionality, adequacy,
and integration. These models are:
1. Minimalist-libertarian model —
Strong universality and unconditionality of
guaranteed income set at a low benefit level
with minimal provision of other social
goods and income support.

out, although to different degrees depending
upon the type of guaranteed income proposal
under consideration. Traditionally, three concerns predominate:
• Work disincentive effect — Receipt
of a generous and unconditional benefit
may mean some individuals will opt out of
participation in the paid labour market.

2. Mixed welfare model — Guaranteed
income models that closely resemble
existing social assistance (welfare) schemes
with partial and conditional benefits, and a
range of both benefit levels and integration
with other social programs.

• Cost — A substantial guaranteed income
scheme may be too expensive to be
politically acceptable or possible.

3. Strong basic income model — Strong
universality and unconditionality paired
with more generous benefit levels and
variable integration with other programs.
Models 1 and 3 incorporate a guaranteed income
as a stand-alone program that is relatively distinct and prominent in the overall social welfare
architecture. The general intent of Model 1 is to
downsize the social welfare state, but also to keep
the poor from starving. Model 3, on the other
hand, includes proposals with more ambitious
aims of redistributing wealth and establishing
social solidarity. Both of these models are relatively simple in design, but vary in terms of cost:
Model 1 stipulates minimal benefit levels while
Model 3 requires a relatively generous benefit.
Model 2, on the other hand, seeks to guarantee
a minimum level of income for all through a
patchwork quilt of traditional income support
programs paired with a more limited guaranteed
income. Of course, no real proposal necessarily
maps exactly onto any one model, but instead will
mix and match different elements of each.
A number of straightforward concerns about
the merit of the idea of a guaranteed income stand
4
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• Reciprocity — An unconditional benefit
will give significant public resources to
individuals who may contribute nothing to
society in return.

Added to these problems are additional questions about how guaranteed income proposals
may reinforce the gendered division of labour and
women’s economic, civil, and political subordination. Equally concerning are observations about
how guaranteed income proposals lend support
to regressive and unjust neo-liberal forms of social and economic organization.
Practical implementation of a guaranteed income may result in unacceptable political compromises, such as in inadequate benefit levels,
partial implementation that forestalls more radical progressive change, and selective application
to only the “deserving poor.”
The paper concludes by noting that poverty is
more than the simple lack of financial resources.
While absence of money is an essential feature
of poverty, social exclusion as well as inadequate
access to public goods, networks, and political
capital are all part of a fuller notion of poverty.
Such an understanding of poverty means that a
range of measures will be key to effective welfare reform, including:
• Enhanced collective provision of essential
public goods;
• Labour market policy reform; and
• Public, affordable, and quality childcare.

While the authors of this report conclude in
somewhat different positions on the desirability of a guaranteed income program, both
strongly recognize that no single social program alone will be adequate. While a just so-

ciety will certainly provide some form of income security, this alone will not satisfy the
full scope of collective and public responsibility such a society bears for the welfare of
its population.
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Introduction
Canada has rates of poverty that belie the economic health and wealth of this country. Pockets of poverty persist for specific groups, and the
duration, depth, and rate of their poverty is often
shocking. Far too many individuals in Canada
lack decent housing, adequate nutrition, and full
participation in our social and economic life.
For decades now, commentators of all stripes
have criticized the course of the Canadian income security system. A spate of reports from
various quarters—the academy, research institutes, community coalitions—have called for
re-visioning of Canada’s income security system. This has been coupled with the growing
recognition of poverty and income inequality
as immediate concerns. There is consensus that
change is needed, but no agreement as to what
that change should be.
In this report the authors explore the substantive merit and strategic appeal of a guaranteed income as one option for a fundamental
re-thinking of current income support programs
in Canada. The last five years have seen a resurgence in calls for a guaranteed income, particularly from anti-poverty and equality-seeking
groups. In fact, the idea of a guaranteed income
6
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has cycled through Canadian social policy debates on a regular basis and has never been far
below the political surface.
This discussion paper looks seriously at the
suggestion of a guaranteed income and the challenges such a reform poses for traditional ways
of thinking about income security issues in our
country. A guaranteed income may indeed offer
a valuable opportunity to move out of the “very
well worn ruts” of welfare reform.1 Or, the idea
may promise more than it can deliver. These are
the questions we take up.
The analysis and conclusions in this paper are
the result of ongoing conversation and collaborative work on the idea of a guaranteed income
by the co-authors. One of us (Young) is more of
a sceptic and the other (Mulvale) more of a proponent of guaranteed income. Both, however,
agree that the question of ensuring universal,
unconditional, and adequate economic security for all people in Canada is critical. We have
learned much from each other, as well as from
the academic literature, research data, and views
of policy experts and community activists with
whom we have engaged in the course of preparing this report.2

What is a Guaranteed Income?
We use the term “guaranteed income” to refer to
a general category of proposals for a minimum
level of income security for everyone in Canada. We use this rather general term in order to
be inclusive of the full range of policy proposals
that are part of the debate around this approach
to income security.
There are, of course, other commonly used
labels—guaranteed annual income, citizen’s
wage, guaranteed livable income, basic income,
social dividend, territorial dividend, state bonus, demogrant—that appear in debate and literature. Within English Canada, the most common term — despite a wide variance of detail in
what is specifically meant — is Guaranteed Annual Income. Debates on this topic in Quebec
have tended to use the French terms “l’allocation
universelle” and “le revenu de citoyenneté.” Indeed, it is a sign of the vigour and extent of the
argument that such a range of terminology exists. We are faced with, as one commentator puts
it, “certain imprecision when it comes to definition and a surplus of choice when it comes to
terminology.”3
Consequently, providing an initial starting
definition of a guaranteed income is tricky. How-

ever, the following characteristics of a strong variant of a guaranteed income are useful markers.
At this point in our discussion, this definition is
given to distinguish our subject from more commonplace and existing versions of income security, such as provincial social assistance (welfare
programs). More nuanced discussion of the range
of proposals follows later in the report.
The purest or strongest versions of guaranteed income proposals generally specify a floor
or minimum level of core income provided on a
continuing basis by the state, to which everyone
is entitled irrespective of personal circumstances
or need, subject to no or very few conditions of
eligibility, such as work requirements.
Under this model, an executive earning
$150,000 would receive the same benefit as the
minimum wage secretary sitting outside that executive’s office door, the unemployed but workseeking individual handing that secretary a job
application, the at-home parent pushing twins in
a stroller outside the office building, and the unemployed person not looking for work who is sitting at the café on the other side of the street.
But as we note repeatedly, there is great variety among guaranteed income proposals with
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both large and minor departures from the central vision defined above. And, the line between
traditional income security provision and guaranteed income proposals can blur, depending
upon the details of each. Consequently, in the
discussion that follows, we do provide a series
of working models that categorize the range of
different proposals at play in the debate.
There is no full-fledged guaranteed income
program in place anywhere in the world. A
number of jurisdictions have programs that
can be understood to be partial or fledgling

8
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guaranteed income schemes. For example, the
Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend, starting in
1999, has paid to each adult resident of Alaska
an annual “dividend.” These payments are on a
small scale ($1,654 in 2007 for each applicant),
but nonetheless have some features in common
with more generous and full guaranteed income
proposals.4 In Canada, some claim that our national Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income
Supplement program, which ensures an annual
income for all those over 65, is a form of guaranteed income.

The Idea and its General Appeal
One Belgian observer of the debate over a guaranteed income has described the idea as “a washing powder that can be used in any washing machine,” from right to left.5 Multiple and sometimes
contending versions make debate about guaranteed income varied, fascinating, and challenging. When endorsed simply as an appealing idea,
many applaud the notion. But when the details
of a guaranteed income program are up for debate, the consensus weakens, often but not always
along predictable ideological grounds.
So what is the general appeal of an idea of a
guaranteed income? The following arguments
are made.
• A Fix to Poverty: First, and most
powerfully, a guaranteed income holds out
the promise of alleviating (and perhaps
even eradicating) poverty—at least poverty
understood simply as lack of income.
This helps to explain the attractiveness of
guaranteed income in times of growing
economic inequality and persistent poverty
amidst affluence.
• A Measure of Formal Liberty
and Individual Opportunity: A

guaranteed income proposal is not only
and simply about ending poverty. The
most powerful political arguments for
a guaranteed income are animated by
particular views of social justice, equality,
and freedom. A guaranteed income, by
providing a core income for all, is seen to
promise equality of opportunity in society.6
A guaranteed income, at an adequate level,
allows an individual to realize for herself
or himself the promises and opportunities
that society offers.
• A Means to Social and Democratic
Citizenship: A guaranteed income is also
touted as a way to ensure citizens can fulfil
the civic duties we all carry as citizens.
We cannot aspire to civic virtues when
we are preoccupied with mere survival.
Thus, an American political theorist,
Carole Pateman, argues that the economic
security a guaranteed income provides
is instrumental to self-government in
intimate spheres (the family), the labour
market, and, more broadly, in democratic
mechanisms of political government.7
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• A Key to Gender Equality:
Poverty often means reinforcement of
discriminatory social and economic
relations for women. For example, lack
of income can force women to stay in
abusive, unhealthy relationships with men.
As well, the gendered division of labour,
reflected in women’s disproportionate
caregiving responsibilities, results in
women’s more vulnerable status in the
labour market. Income support programs
that are conditional on specific patterns of
(typically male) labour force involvement
disadvantage women (and mothers, in
particular). A guaranteed income, it is
argued, encourages recognition of the full
range of human activities, including unpaid
caregiving work, that are key to a cohesive
and rich society. An individual could make
“real choices with reference to economic
and non-economic activities.”8 Moreover,
the universality and conditionality that
a guaranteed income offers can make
traditional scrutiny of welfare recipients
unnecessary. The income security provided
by guaranteed income, it is argued, could
advance women’s economic and social
citizenship and equality.
• A Recognition of Citizens’ Shared
Social Ownership: Many see a
guaranteed income as recognition of
individual citizens’ shared ownership
in the resources of a society. Fairness, it
is argued, requires that a portion of the
goods of a society—its collective wealth
and resources—be shared with all who
make up that society. The Alaska Dividend,
for example, is paid out of the Alaska
Permanent Fund, a fund created out of
a percentage of the proceeds of mineral
sales or royalties, and thus recognizes the
ultimate “ownership” by residents of the
products of the state. Closer to home, the
10
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one-time Alberta Prosperity cheque, paid
out in January 2006 to every resident of
Alberta over 18 years of age, was billed as a
“resource rebate” to Alberta residents from
the budget surpluses accumulated from the
province’s resource-fuelled economy.
• A More Flexible and Just Labour
Market: Proponents argue that a
guaranteed income gives workers flexibility
more suited to the new global market. A
guaranteed income gives an individual
a level of basic economic well-being
independent of involvement in the paid
labour force. This might mean a number
of positive things. For example, workers
with a guaranteed income in hand could
choose to start up a business, work parttime, job share, take a sabbatical, or
take an interesting but lower paid job. A
guaranteed income would “decommodify”
labour by providing individuals with the
ability to devote their energies to socially
necessary and valuable forms of work
that are not paid. It might also enhance
the power of labour to bargain effectively
with capital. For low wage, unattractive
work, this may mean that workers will be
able to leverage better working conditions
or better pay. Thus a guaranteed income
could prevent “desperation bidding” by
workers with no other economic options.
• A More Environmentally
Sustainable World: Perhaps a system
of income security with guaranteed
income as its centrepiece could challenge
conventional wisdom on the need for
never-ending economic growth as the
precondition of general prosperity and
income security. Guaranteed income could
ensure a modest but sustainable standard
of living for all, in the context of a more
“steady state” economy with lower levels
of consumption but greater economic

redistribution. This scenario challenges
the obsession in capitalist economies with
open-ended accumulation and ever-rising
levels of earned income and consumption
of material goods. It also undermines
“wage slavery” that has been central to

the historical development of capitalist
economies.
As outlined above, the benefits claimed for a
guaranteed income are many and compelling.
It is no surprise that the idea of a guaranteed
income is resilient and resurgent.
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The Contours (So Far)
of the Guaranteed Income
Debate in Canada
The history of the idea of a guaranteed income
in western thought is long and already well documented.9 In twentieth century Canada, more
specifically, the idea of a guaranteed income of
some sort has had resonance for a range of groups,
at different times and in reference to different
reform agendas. The following chronology sets
out some of this historical background to current debates.
In 1933 a Social Credit government led by
William Aberhart was elected in Alberta. Aberhart argued for regular cash payments made by
the provincial government to all, as a means of
economic stimulus and redistribution. But the
promise of a “social credit” paid to all citizens
proved difficult to implement, in part due to a
lack of funds in the provincial treasury and opposition from Ottawa. The plan ultimately ran
afoul of judicial insistence that the federal government alone had constitutional control over
currency and banking. Aberhart’s successor as
Alberta Premier, Ernest Manning, officially abandoned Social Credit doctrine in 1944.
The next significant moment came during the
1960s. In 1968 the Economic Council of Canada,
a former federally funded crown corporation,
12
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noted the presence of poverty in Canada “on a
much larger scale than most Canadians probably suspect.”10 The idea of a guaranteed income
emerged as one mechanism for addressing this
newly acknowledged poverty. Indeed, 1967 had
seen the introduction of the Old Age Security’s
Guaranteed Income Supplement as an (initially
assumed to be temporary) measure to reduce
poverty among seniors.
The Special Senate Committee on Poverty,
chaired by Senator David Croll, was created in
1968 to study poverty in Canada and recommend effective policy measures to address the
problem. The Committee’s 1971 report recommended a guaranteed annual income financed
and administered by the federal government,
and delivered through a negative income tax.
The Committee wrote that this proposal met
three basic requirements: “it provides adequate
income, it preserves the incentive to work, and it
is fiscally possible.”11 The guaranteed annual income was an idea, the Committee wrote, “whose
time had come.”12
The proposed guaranteed income would
cover all Canadian citizens “who need it” (excluding those who were single, unattached, and

under the age of 40), and was to take the form
of a negative income tax. It would provide a
guaranteed income of 70 per cent of the poverty
lines set by the Committee and would be paired
with a 70 per cent reduction rate for each dollar
of additional income earned. The basic tax exemption was to be raised to the poverty level so
that those receiving only the income guarantee
would not pay taxes.
The guaranteed income proposed by the Croll
report provided an income of $3,500 for a family
of four or the equivalent of roughly $19,224 in
2008 dollars, adjusting for inflation. The report
estimated the cost of such a scheme, for 1967, at
$645 million (just over $4.1 billion in 2008). This
amount represented around 1 per cent more of
1967 GNP than existing income security costs.
The guaranteed income proposed in the Croll
report would replace all federal income-maintenance programs, with the exceptions of federal
programs such as unemployment insurance, the
Canada Pension Plan, and Veterans’ Allowances.
Provincial governments would remain responsible for the provision of social services, with the
Canadian Assistance Plan retained to provide for
federal/provincial cooperation in the delivery of
such services. In this way, individuals not covered
under the guaranteed annual income would be
provided for based on a needs test.
The cost of this proposal was a significant
hurdle to its acceptance. As well, critics focused
on the issue of inadequate work incentives and
the reduction rate. Earnings would have to be
well above the benefit level for significant income
enhancement to occur through paid work. The
plan was never implemented.
The Castonguay-Nepveu Commission, appointed by the Quebec government, followed in
1971. The Commission recommended a three-tier
income security plan for Quebec. The first tier
consisted of a basic negative income tax called
the General Social Allowances Plan (GSAP). The
GSAP would replace existing Quebec social assistance with two levels of benefit: one for the

“employable” and another for the “not employable.” Benefits for the employable would be 60
per cent of benefits for the not employable. It
was assumed that employable recipients would
supplement their benefits with employment
earnings.13
Around the same time the federal Department
of National Health and Welfare wrote that the
idea of a guaranteed income as an anti-poverty
measure had potential, but needed further study
and investigation.14
In 1970 the Royal Commission on the Status of Women was established. The Commission recommended, among other things, that a
“guaranteed annual income be paid by the federal government to the heads of all one-parent
families with dependent children.”15 While arguing that a guaranteed annual income would
benefit all Canadians, the report nonetheless
recommended that the program be at least initially targeted where the need was greatest: to
single parents, specifically sole-support mothers. The specific form of guaranteed annual income recommended was a negative income tax
scheme, joined with reduction of other federal
and provincial income security schemes.
In 1973 a minority federal Liberal government
initiated the Social Security Review, marked by
the publication of the Working Paper on Social
Security in Canada.16 Known as the Orange Paper, the working paper argued for a two-tiered
approach to social assistance, including a guaranteed annual income plan for those who could
not work and an income supplement for the
working poor. Ultimately, the review came to
naught and folded in 1976. At this point, discussion of guaranteed income receded from the government agenda for some time. Two Canadian
economists, Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson,
argue that the late 1970s were marked by preoccupation with rising inflation, wage and price
controls, and growing deficits, and were inhospitable to engagement with the notion of guaranteed income.17
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Advocacy of guaranteed income programs,
however, continued from a number of organizations inside the mainstream social policy community. For example, in 1976 the National Council of Welfare, an advisory body to the Minister
of Health and Welfare, released its Guide to the
Guaranteed Income.18
One other interesting artefact from this period remains. In 1974, a year after the start of
the federal review of social security, the governments of Canada and Manitoba signed an
agreement to begin a trial run of a basic income experiment, clearly linking the experiment to the Social Security Review. Later that
year a version of guaranteed annual income,
the Manitoba Basic Guarantee Annual Income
Experiment (dubbed “Mincome”) was piloted.
While initially envisioned by at least the Manitoba government as a simple and relatively inexpensive trial, Mincome evolved into a complicated experiment, with a focus on the issue
of whether or not a guaranteed income would
provide a disincentive for recipients to engage
in paid labour.
The Mincome project involved 1,300 Manitoba
families, from both urban and rural communities, and distributed these families randomly between a number of different guaranteed income
plans and a control group for three years. Families with incomes above a certain amount were
excluded from the trials and those included in
the study were assigned, in 1974 dollars, one of
three support levels ($3,800, $4,800, $5,800) for
a family of two adults and two children. Three
different tax-back rates (the rate at which benefit payments will be reduced for each dollar of
additional income brought into the family) were
used: 35 per cent, 50 per cent, and 75 per cent.
The most generous combination ($5,800 benefit and 35 per cent tax back) and least generous
combination ($3,800 benefit and 75 per cent tax
back) were not tested.
By 1979, the experiment was closed: the Social Security Review was over and, as mentioned,
14
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there appeared to be little political support at any
government level for a guaranteed income program. The project resulted in no official findings,
few results of the experiment were published, and
much of the data collected remain archived to
this day.19 Hum and Simpson attribute this outcome to “mundane factors such as money, timing [and] changing policy preferences.”20
But by the mid-1980s the idea of a guaranteed income was back on the policy agenda, due
primarily to the 1982 Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects
for Canada (Macdonald Commission).21 The
1985 report from the Macdonald Commission
was marked by general concern about economic efficiency and support for free market forces.
Central among the number of reforms to the Canadian welfare system that were recommended
was implementation of a Universal Income Security Program (UISP). The UISP was billed as
bringing about reform that would be “radical,
not cosmetic, and wholesale rather than tinkering at the margin.” The Commission pointedly chose not to use the term “guaranteed annual income” to describe this proposal, as the
UISP had benefit levels considerably lower than
those traditionally associated with guaranteed
incomes. Nonetheless, the UISP stands as a guaranteed income proposal. The Macdonald Commission’s recommendations with respect to the
UISP were echoed a year after the report was released by the Forget Commission on Unemployment Insurance.22
The Macdonald Commission proposed that
the UISP would eventually replace much of the
then existing welfare state, including the Guaranteed Income Supplement, family allowances,
the refundable child tax credit, child and marital tax exemptions, federal social housing programs, federal transfers to the provinces for social assistance, and the income support functions
of unemployment insurance. Old Age Security
would be left intact with current levels of support. The UISP benefit itself would be financed

by a reallocation of expenditures for the eliminated programs. Key to the Commission’s recommendation was their understanding that the
reform would thus impose no extra cost and,
indeed, might even save a considerable amount
of money.
Unlike more traditional guaranteed income
programs, the UISP was to have a relatively low
guarantee level and a low reduction rate. The
objective, the McDonald report notes, was preservation of work incentives with some income
support.23 The report recommended a universal
demogrant-based delivery system,24 rather than
a strictly tax-based system, although argued
that either would be effective. The report also
recognized that a phasing in of the UISP would
be required.
The McDonald report acknowledged that the
income guarantees proposed were not adequate
to meet all family needs without additional support, a choice made deliberately to preserve work
incentives. The report also assumed that provincial or municipal social assistance top-ups
as a second tier of benefits would continue to
be available for families with very little income.
Benefits for young recipients would be contingent upon an “active job search”25 and benefits
for those between 18 and 35 might be restricted
to half of the level for older recipients.26 Thus,
the proposal was not a truly universal one. Benefit levels and tax-back rates varied somewhat
depending on age and family status.
Criticism of the UISP came quickly and from
a variety of directions. From the left, commentators pointed out that the UISP suffered from the
Commission’s failure to acknowledge the context of increasing unemployment and poverty,
the dismantling of existing social programs, and
growing income inequalities of the 1980s.27 Indeed, the recommendations of the Commission
adhered to conservative mainstream 1960s and
70s traditions of thinking about guaranteed income schemes. Critics were quick to point out
that such a scheme would effectively institution-

alize poverty, setting income security benefits
for many at lower levels than even existing programs. The UISP also met with strong opposition
from the Canadian labour movement.28
While the Mulroney government implemented the Commission’s recommendations for
free trade, the UISP proposals were ignored by
the government and, for many, the MacDonald
Commission proposal has come to symbolize the
dangers of guaranteed income proposals.
A discussion paper tabled in the House of
Commons in 1994 by then Minister of Human
Resources Lloyd Axworthy dismissed the idea of
implementation of a formal guaranteed income
program. The paper noted that Canada’s current
mix of social assistance and tax credit programs
was a “de facto guaranteed minimum income.”29
The paper went on to argue against a specific
guaranteed income program on the grounds of
cost and effectiveness. A supplementary paper
issued along with the discussion paper continues
to be widely read and influential in the guaranteed income debate in Canada.30
Recent years have seen not only a revival of
the idea of a guaranteed income in grassroots
and civil society conversations, but a casting
of the program in more radical form by many
groups. In 2006, The Women’s Livable Income
Working Group strongly argued for a guaranteed
income in its Women’s Economic Justice Report,
assembled from interviews with 44 “grassroots”
women.31 In September 2004, feminists, activists, scholars and writers from across the country met in Pictou, Nova Scotia, and issued the
Pictou Statement in which they called for “an
indexed guaranteed living income for all individual residents set at a level to enable comfortable living.”32 This endorsement of a guaranteed
income has been echoed, to differing degrees,
by a number of non-government organizations
in various publications focusing on social welfare reform.33
The idea of a guaranteed income also continues to pop up in the political arena. In 2000, then
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Prime Minister Jean Chretien was rumoured to
be considering a guaranteed income. In 2006,
the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry released an interim report in which
a guaranteed income was touted as a possible
means of reducing rural poverty.34 Hugh Segal,
a Conservative member of Canada’s Senate, has
considerable visibility as an advocate for a guaranteed income. While he would retain special
programs for the aged, disabled and for education and health care, his proposal for a guaranteed income would collapse other programs
into a basic living income offered in the form of
negative income tax.35
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The 2008 federal election saw Elizabeth May’s
federal Green Party support the idea of a “Guaranteed Livable Income.” The Green Party platform
envisioned an incremental implementation of a
guaranteed income initiated by a federal benefit of
$5,000 to every individual on provincial welfare.
At the 2008 Congress of the Basic Income
Earth Network (BIEN) in Dublin, Ireland, BIEN
Canada was launched as a national chapter of the
international group. Its objective is to promote
awareness and informed debate about guaranteed income among activists, researchers, and
politicians across the country.36
The debate clearly continues.

Dimensions and Models of
Guaranteed Income Proposals
Academic and political literature on the idea of
a guaranteed income is vast. No single overview
model is representative of all ideas for a guaranteed
income. In this section we elaborate, first, several
basic dimensions along which the proposals vary
and, second, three basic models that can be situated
along these dimensions that reflect the debate.

Basic Dimensions to Guaranteed Income
Proposals
Four criteria characterize and distinguish guaranteed income proposals:
• Degree of universality of eligibility;
• Degree of conditionality of entitlement;
• Adequacy of benefit level; and
• Integration with other social programs.37
Universality
Tight definitions of universality and conditionality are impossible—the two terms are used
elastically and often interchangeably. Questions about one often shape conclusions about
the other. Yet each captures an important and
distinct policy dimension.

The question of universality refers to the
range of the general population that is, as an
initial starting point, covered by the policy. The
more universal a benefit is, the more general
and widespread its potential distribution across
the population will be. More selective policies
single out smaller subsets of the population for
coverage. As a strongly universal benefit, a specific guaranteed income policy would provide
for every individual adult member of society,
irrespective of income levels. For example, academics Sally Lerner, Charles Clark and Robert Needham have argued for a Basic Income
system that employs a notion of universality
that dictates payment of benefits to every Canadian citizen or permanent resident.38 Few, if
any, proposals for a guaranteed income argue
for complete universality—generally citizenship
(or residency) and age feature in some way to
exclude some individuals or groups. Some proposals have a kind of differential universality:
for example, adults might receive larger benefits
than children.
The broad universality of many guaranteed
income schemes makes the issues of cost and
distributional equity significant features of
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the political debate. As the breadth of coverage widens towards universality, of course, the
up-front cost of providing a guaranteed income
rises. This may achieve greater coverage (everyone gets something), but it also raises issues
of vertical economic distribution because the
wealthy receive the same benefit as individuals
at lower income levels. While a progressive taxback rate can correct the regressive impact of
such coverage, the optics of providing benefits
to those who do not need them along with the
initial budgetary impact of such universality
may make it politically difficult to have a benefit level that is significant in alleviating and
reducing poverty.
In considering universality, there is also
the question of whether payments should be
made to individuals or to household units, or
to both at different levels. Most proposals provide for direct payments to individuals, citing
reasons of individual liberty in lifestyle choice
and administrative ease. Concerns about gender equality feature strongly in favour of a more
individualised approach. Proponents of paying
benefits to households, on the other hand, cite
concerns of general equity in relation to the
economies of scale that larger households can
achieve, and of the need for consistency with
existing household-focused programs. This latter approach, of course, involves the contentious
task of defining what is or is not considered to
be a “household.”
Conditionality
Conditionality sets out the kind of conditions that
are built into a policy that may limit the eligibility
of a person otherwise covered by the program.
Most existing income security programs have
a number of conditions that recipients need to
satisfy in order to gain and maintain eligibility.
Guaranteed income proposals are distinctive in
that they typically claim to be (at least mostly)
unconditional. For example, an unconditional
guaranteed income policy would be neutral as to
18
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how the benefit payment is spent, or beneficiaries’ social living arrangements. Notably, recipients of such an unconditional guaranteed income
would have no requirements of labour force involvement or availability, labour skills training,
or job seeking. As we discuss later, the unconditionality (or limited conditionality) of most
guaranteed income proposals stands as one of
the most significant political obstacles to general
acceptance of guaranteed income reforms. On
the other hand, monitoring and enforcing participation as a condition of receiving guaranteed
income adds to administrative complexity and
expense of delivering the program, and may be
an intrusive, punitive, and stigmatizing experience for those receiving benefits.
Unconditionality and universality, it is argued,
could be combined to cast guaranteed income
as a basic entitlement of membership in Canadian society. Such a benefit could be seen as a
right of citizenship, as important as (for example) the right to vote.
Adequacy
Proposals vary greatly in terms of the amount
of money that should be paid as a guaranteed
income benefit. Some proposed levels exceed,
others fall considerably short of, what might be
commonly conceived as adequate. A guaranteed income is understood variably as a small
“top-up” to other sources of income, as a partial
income, or as a fully livable income. Notably, a
number of current Canadian proposals argue
for a “guaranteed adequate income,” thereby
indicating a benefit level that permits a decent
level of income.
Proposals also vary in terms of form and
duration of benefit provision. Policy proposals
might envision a regular income stream (where
payments are received on a weekly, monthly, even
yearly basis), or benefits that have a time limit on
eligibility (say three or five years). Some guaranteed income plans consider regional variation in
benefit level. Clearly, costs of living are higher

in some areas of Canada – in large cities, for example – than in other regions. A single benefit
level ignores this variability.
Integration
A key question is how much a guaranteed income
proposal is integrated with other income support
programs and the provision of “in kind” public
goods such as health care and social housing.
Some proponents of a guaranteed income
endorse a guaranteed income as replacement
for most other income security programs (such
as unemployment insurance, social assistance,
and public pensions). Other proposals envision
a guaranteed income program that is complemented by a number of other publicly provided
income supports, services and goods. Obviously,
if and how guaranteed income is integrated with
other social and income support programs will
affect its ultimate cost.

Three Working Models for Guaranteed
Income
As we have already noted, there is no one single representative model that captures the full
scope of what has been proposed as a guaranteed income.
For purposes of further discussion and debate we have generated three general models that
identify some important themes and variations
in application of the four criteria set out above—
universality, conditionality, adequacy, and integration. The three models that we set out here
are “ideal types.” Actual proposals may blend
and mix aspects from more than one of these
working models. But these three models help
to map the terrain of policy debate and choices
in regard to guaranteed income.
The three models we identify are:
• Minimalist-libertarian model;
• Mixed welfare model; and,
• Strong basic income model.

A brief discussion of each of the three models
follows.
1. Minimalist-libertarian Model
This model stipulates a base income guaranteed
to all adult residents, with no conditions attached. However, the benefit is set at an income
level unlikely to raise individuals out of poverty.
The concern is to protect a paid work incentive.
In this model, guaranteed income tends to be
paired with elimination of most other income
support programs and public services now offered by federal and provincial government.
Thus, this model is premised on strong universality and unconditionality. But it has weak adequacy and is not integrated with other means
of income security and the provision of public
goods. It extends the income guarantee widely
and easily, but is informed by a political philosophy of individual responsibility and limited
government. It is often premised on arguments
for radical downsizing of the welfare state and
of labour market regulations such as minimum
wage laws. The Macdonald Commission proposal is an illustration of this type. So too is the
proposal from right-wing American economist
Milton Friedman for an income security scheme
targeted at low-income people delivered through
a “negative income tax” mechanism.39
2. Mixed Welfare Model
This category represents those proposals that
blend the existing system of income security and
the notion of a guaranteed income.
Guaranteed income proposals in this model
are partial and typically extended to a smaller
subset of the population, based on variables such
as age, income level, and labour market participation. So, they are not fully universal. These
proposals also vary in terms of how adequate or
unconditional the benefit is. A key characteristic
is the mix of income security measures. Joined
with a qualified guaranteed income program are
partial income security for some groups, through
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existing discretionary, means-tested income support programs (especially provincial social assistance programs), and less stigmatizing, contributory social insurance programs (such as
Employment Insurance and the Canada/Quebec
Pension Plans). Thus, this model is strong on integration of a limited guaranteed income with
other income security programs.
Within this general model some proposals are
more minimalist and severe in terms of income
security guarantees, with a stronger emphasis on
paying out benefits only to those who “deserve”
them, and as a supplement (rather than a partial
or full replacement) of the income that everyone
is expected to earn in the labour market. These
proposals concern themselves with “activation”
policies to encourage participation in the paid
labour market. Guaranteed income elements of
these proposals are thus often characterized by
low benefits, a limited number of recipients and
frequent linkage to paid work—they have weak
adequacy, reduced universality, and varied conditionality elements. However, integration with
other income security measures of a more traditional and individualistic sort is high.
Other proposals in this category take a wider and more generous approach. For example, a
mixed-welfare proposal may stipulate long-term,
adequate, and non-stigmatizing income benefits to
persons not expected to participate in the labour
market (e.g. the elderly and persons with serious
disabilities), paired with short-term, emergency
assistance for other individuals, along with extended coverage and higher benefit levels for programs such as unemployment insurance. Thus,
some categories of people are given guaranteed
support through allowances that are independent of labour-market participation, while others
are not. Thus, elements of universality and adequacy are stronger, and income support is seen
as linked with the collective provision of social
goods. But because guaranteed income is often
linked to “legitimate” disqualification from work
or participation in some non-market form of work
20
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(e.g. caring for children at home), unconditionality is weaker. An example of a proposal at this
more generous end of the scale is contained in
the 2006 Caledon Institute report Towards a New
Architecture for Canada’s Adult Benefits. The report argues for an income-tested, long-term, adequate basic income for individuals who cannot
reasonably be expected to work.40
3. Strong Basic Income or Guaranteed
Adequate Income Model
This model stipulates that a guaranteed income
should provide the material basis for “real freedom for all” through a significant redistribution
of wealth. Proposals of this type seek to eliminate poverty and ensure a universal and unconditional liveable income.
This model has a number of key elements.
First, the benefit is paid by the state out of publicly controlled resources to every individual
(or household unit), regardless of the income or
wealth of that individual (or household unit).
The payment would be in cash and would have
no restrictions as to how it is spent. It would be
paid on a regular basis, say every month. Second, all members of a given society would receive the income, although what is meant by
members can vary. Some think of membership
as restricted to legal citizens; most proponents,
however, conceive of membership in a broader
sense that includes all legal permanent residents.
Third, the payment is unconditional: no means
test or work requirement would accompany it.
Fourth, the level of income guaranteed is formulated to lift each individual recipient’s income
above the poverty line or some other indicator
of adequacy or liveability.
One of the best-known advocates in the current debate, Belgian scholar Philippe Van Parijs,
argues for such a version of guaranteed income.41
Van Parijs argues that this variant of guaranteed
income “is a profound reform that belongs in the
same league as the abolition of slavery or the introduction of universal suffrage.”42

The result is a model that has the features
of strong universality and unconditionality, but
that is also paired with a high level of adequacy. Integration with other elements of income
security and welfare is variable—the model is
sometimes postulated as replacing most other
income security programs and other times proposed as an addition to continuing provision of
some other programs for both income security
and public goods. Some advocates further argue for deregulation of the labour market as
companion policy to a strong guaranteed income program, thus pairing this robust version of guaranteed income with a strengthened
free market.43
The Participation Income Variant
A variant of this model of guaranteed income
is the idea of a “participation income.” In these
sorts of proposals, the guaranteed income benefit

is available to everyone but a reciprocity norm
dictates that recipients must be engaged in either
paid work or some form of socially necessary or
useful work (for example, household or care work
in the home, artistic production, or volunteer labour in the community). Thus universality and
conditionality are paired in this variant.
The Stakeholder’s Grant Variant
The stakeholder’s grant idea has historic roots in
the writings of Thomas Paine44. More recently
two American scholars, Bruce Ackerman and
Anne Alstott, have proposed a Universal Basic
Capital whereby a considerable payment is made
to each individual on a one-off basis, for example, at the beginning of adulthood.45 Some proposals call for the development of an account or
grant where use of funds is restricted to a range
of specific purposes, such as advanced education
or launching a new business.

An Aside on Delivery Mechanisms:
Universal Demogrant or Negative Income Tax?
All of these models assume that a guaranteed income program could be delivered either through
a universal demogrant or through a negative income tax.
A universal demogrant involves an up-front payment, typically tax-free, to all (adult) citizens. Thus,
it is paid regardless of income level, in the same amount to all individuals with no reduction rate.
Most universal demogrant proposals stipulate that all other income is taxable, and typically at a
rate higher than current income tax rates. Indeed, many proponents argue for a flat tax rate on
all other income, although this is not an inevitable feature of universal demogrant programs.
A negative income tax provides, through the device of a tax credit, a cash benefit to families
or individuals with no or low income. A family or individual is guaranteed to reach at least the
minimum cash benefit income level. Payment is reduced by a “tax back” rate for every dollar
of additional income received. Once the recipient reaches a certain level of income, the benefit
reduces to zero. Thus, under a negative income tax scheme there are three groups of benefit
recipients: those receiving full benefits, those receiving partial benefits, and those receiving no
benefits. Unlike a demogrant, a negative income tax is paid out selectively and involves considerably less “up front” budgetary spending.
Of course, the initial spending of a demogrant can be recouped through the tax system, should
tax structures be so calibrated. A demogrant also advances money to those who need it in the
present moment, while a negative income tax (unless structured to allow advance application)
makes recipients wait for payment contingent upon the “income test” represented by a tax filing.
The negative income tax is thus less responsive to the immediate contingences of low-income
economic life.
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Critique of the Idea
There is much that is compelling about a guaranteed income, as we have already signalled. But
a number of concerns stand out, both straightforward concerns about the merits of the idea
itself, and cautions about the pragmatic dangers
of implementation. Both types of concerns are
discussed below.

The Merits of the Idea Itself
The characteristics of universality and unconditionality, key to what is attractive and distinctive
about a guaranteed income, also provide a focus
for a series of critiques—particularly the three
traditional and perennial concerns of work incentives, reciprocity, and cost.
Work Incentives
Someone in receipt of a generous unconditional benefit may no longer wish to work. This may
be particularly true if work is tiresome and low
paying and the recipient decides that the combination of leisure time and guaranteed income
is preferable to whatever the additional benefits
of paid work might be.
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The issue of work incentive is represented
in the debate by the image of the Malibu surfer,
quick to use the guaranteed income benefit to
quit work and spend the days on the beach. If
large numbers of individuals opt out of paid work
to live on their guaranteed incomes, economic
productivity and growth may be imperilled.
Proponents of guaranteed income have a range
of responses. They argue, as we have already noted,
that a guaranteed income is actually facilitative
of more creative, flexible, and productive involvement in a greater variety of work and paid labour.
Moreover, guaranteed income experiments, such
as the Manitoba Mincome program discussed
earlier,46 showed only modest work disincentive
effects.47 Such a small effect on work incentives
is not particularly economically significant—although it may certainly be politically significant
for those who oppose a guaranteed income.
Connected to concerns about labour force involvement are criticisms that a guaranteed income
will amount to no more than simple employer
subsidization and an incentive for employers to
reduce workers’ wages. The historic example in
England over 200 years ago, the Speenhamland
system, is frequently used (although not without

significant debate48) to argue that a guaranteed
income may result in worsened exploitative conditions in the labour market, especially a lowering of wages to below subsistence levels. Some
advocates argue this is good, allowing “continued participation of low earners in paid work.”49
Nonetheless, a guaranteed income, from this angle, looks too much like a subsidy to employers
and an incentive to low wages.
Reciprocity
The freeloading surfer that haunts the debate
also symbolizes a second concern. Why pay the
lazy, critics ask. Providing a guaranteed income
to individuals who choose not to “work”—either
in the paid labour market or in community enhancing activities—offends the moral principle
of reciprocity. At a minimum, it is argued, individuals have a duty to work according to their
abilities. To receive something for nothing is
unjust. From this perspective, the decoupling
of income from contribution simply encourages
parasitism. Rather than being a significant step
towards de-commodification and engaged community involvement, guaranteed income is seen
by some as the ultimate “passive benefit.”50
Advocates, like Van Parijs, point out the partiality of the complaint. A guaranteed income
recipient may get something she or he has not
earned, but so too does the idle heiress or talented
hockey player who, from undeserved good luck,
benefits from the current unequal distribution
of wealth, income, ability, and leisure. Why deny
others a modest share of “undeserved gifts”?
But, this is not necessarily a convincing answer
and the moral concern of reciprocity and desert
remains a significant challenge to the theory and
public acceptability of a guaranteed income.
Cost
Any version of guaranteed income — whether
universal or targeted, delivered as a demogrant
or through negative income tax — obviously involves substantial government spending. Rais-

ing taxes is politically unpopular. So committing
substantial public revenue to ensure basic economic security for all is seen by many as beyond
the realm of the “reasonably discussable.”
Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine
some preliminary work done to estimate the
actual budgetary cost of a program of guaranteed income. Lerner, Clark and Needham51 have
presented a hypothetical model of a guaranteed
income for Canada that would be paid as a universal grant to all citizens and permanent residents. They calculated the cost of a scheme that,
in 1999, would pay the very modest income of
$7,000 per year to persons age 65 and over, $5,000
to persons aged 21 to 64, $3,000 to persons under 21 (paid to the primary caregiver), and an
additional $5,000 paid to each household, to be
divided equally among adult members of the
household. The total cost of this scheme was estimated to be $198.6 billion in 1999 dollars. This
guaranteed income program would replace federal benefits for elderly persons and children, as
well as Employment Insurance benefits for the
unemployed. Subtracting these savings, the net
cost of their scheme was calculated as $161.7 billion in 1999 dollars (or $200.3 billion in 2009 dollars). As a point of comparison, the total federal
government revenue for fiscal year 2008/09 was
projected to be $241.9 billion.
In 1994 Human Resources Development
Canada (hrdc) considered the cost of guaranteed income options delivered both as a universal demogrant and through a negative income
tax. The universal demogrant option would require the expenditure of an additional $93 billion ($124 billion in 2009 dollars) and would pay
a benefit level that would be far from “livable.”
On the other hand, the HRDC paper projected
that the negative income tax option (costing a
total of $37.3 billion) would be “cost-neutral.” It
could be financed by savings in other programs
such as unemployment insurance, the child tax
benefit, and federal contributions towards social assistance.
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Hum and Simpson, the Canadian economists
whose work we have already discussed, model
the cost of several variations of what they designate as “Basic Income” (a universal, non-taxable
benefit set at the poverty line so as to eliminate
poverty, at least in principle) and “Guaranteed
Income” (that would be paid out as a universal
benefit set below the poverty line, coupled with
a tax-back rate on earned income).52

Hum and Simpson estimate that their Basic
Income would be very expensive, in one scenario
costing $217.1 billion, compared to $75.8 in existing transfer payments to individuals from the
federal government (in the year 2000). On the
other hand, Hum and Simpson estimate the cost
of their (more modest) Guaranteed Income to be
much less and argue that it could reduce poverty
more efficiently than their Basic Income model.

table 1  What would a Guaranteed Income program cost in Canada?
Cost of possible GI programs (population data 2006):
Grants paid to individuals
Program

Cost (billions)

Grant of $15,000 per year paid to all individuals age 18 and over

$392

Grant of $7,000 per year paid to all individuals age 18 and over

$153

Grant of $15,000 per year for only ages 18 to 64

$327

Grant of $15,000 per year to individuals age 18 and over, plus a demogrant of
$4,000 per year for each child under 18

$418

Grants paid to households
Program

Cost (billions)

Grant paid to households based on household size, where the value of the grant is equal
to the LICO for a mid-sized city (2001 data)

$250

Payments only to individuals and families below the poverty line to bring them up to the
LICO (i.e. reduction of poverty to zero) (2003 data)

$21.5

Cost of existing income security programs (2005)
Program

Cost (billions)

Old Age Supplement
Child Tax Benefit

$29
$9

Employment Insurance

$14

GST and other tax credits

$15

Canada Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan

$32

Provincial payments to individuals (e.g. income assistance)

$32

Local payments to individuals
Total transfers to persons
Basic personal tax exemption (foregone revenue)
Age and spousal tax deductions (foregone revenue)
Total cost of tax deductions
Total transfers to persons ($135b) plus tax expenditures on basic personal & age/
spousal deductions ($29b), minus CPP/QPP as a contributory pension scheme ($32b)

$3
$135
$26
$3
$29
$132

Note: The numbers in these charts are intended to give a general idea of what costs are involved in economic security programs, including possible GI
programs. Most numbers are taken from analysis conducted by Marc Lee, economist at the CCPA. The numbers are approximate.
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In one Guaranteed Income scenario, they peg
the cost at $37.8 billion.53
For purposes of this CCPA report, some cost
estimation was carried out on guaranteed income dispersed as a demogrant, paid to either
individuals or households (see Table 1). The most
adequate version of guaranteed income in this
model (a grant of $15,000 per year to all persons
age 18 and over, and $4,000 per year for those
under 18) is estimated to cost $418 billion. Current costs in 2005 of existing income security
programs were $132 billion,54 meaning that the
net cost of this relatively generous guaranteed
income option would be $286 billion,55 using
the 2005 figure (or $311 billion in 2009 dollars).
One can also calculate the cost of less expensive
options, including a grant to households rather
than individuals that would cost $250 billion
(minus unspecified savings in other areas), and
a targeted benefit to all poor individuals and
households (that would in principle eliminate
poverty) that would cost $21.5 billion.
To put the above figures in context, federal
government spending in 2006/07 on direct transfers to persons was $55.6 billion ($30.3 billion for
the elderly, $14.1 billion to the unemployed, and
$11.2 billion for children). Additionally, the total
Canada Social Transfer to provinces in the same

year was $16.3 billion in both cash and tax points,
although this figure included support for both
post-secondary education and social assistance.
Statistics Canada calculates that, in 2006/07,
the total amount of spending on all social services (including both income support and direct
service to persons) by all levels of government
in Canada was $172.4 billion.56
It thus appears that a full-fledged version of
guaranteed income is out of our immediate financial reach. It is also interesting to note, however,
that a large majority of Canadians believe that the
growing gap between the rich and the poor must
be narrowed, and that higher taxes and closing
tax loopholes for the wealthy are acceptable ways
of doing so.57 There is also a large amount of research evidence concerning the indirect costs of
poverty and economic inequality in our country
in sectors such as health care, criminal justice,
and education. Finally, there is a green argument
that we can no longer support the environmental costs of premising income support and economic redistribution on economic expansion
and growth.58 It will be interesting to see if such
broader calculations of the costs of not having a
guaranteed income scheme will be factored into
debates about the affordability and feasibility of
guaranteed income as time goes on.
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Other Issues
Two other sets of issues about the merits of a
guaranteed income are important to mention.
First, it is of course true that strong guaranteed
income proposals sit in opposition to the more
punitive and minimal income security system the
neo-liberal state tolerates. Yet, ironically a guaranteed income program that neglects or rejects
inclusion with other forms of income assistance
and the provision of public goods can reinforce
the individualism and market focus of neo-liberalism. Second, while feminist support for a
guaranteed income holds centre stage, particularly at the community level in Canada, there are
also prominent feminist critiques of the notion.
These issues are briefly discussed below.

Ideological Resonance
A guaranteed income program requires the state to
redistribute income more broadly and more fairly.
However, emphasis on a guaranteed income alone
as the centrepiece of social welfare provision may
divert attention from the unjust workings of the
market – both the market’s provision of services
and its treatment of workers. A reform program
that does little else than put some money into everyone’s pockets is unlikely to achieve an adequate
26
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re-distribution of social and economic resources.
Indeed, if a guaranteed income is also used as an
excuse or reason to cancel other forms of social
spending and social programming—as some right
wing advocates of the plan envision—the overall
distributive effect of guaranteed income implementation may be regressive and less just.
Guaranteed income proposals may also risk
over-emphasizing the importance of private action and ignoring the roles that public responsibility, public provision, and public ordering of
community institutions can play in securing individual and community welfare. For example,
many advocates of a guaranteed income point
to the possibilities for involvement in volunteer
community work that a guaranteed income allows.59 Yet, community infrastructure surely is
critical enough to warrant adequate financial support from the state. It is great to have community
centres with an active volunteer corps, but surely
it is even better to have community centres with
adequate, trained, and (well) paid staff.
Some models of a guaranteed income, particularly those that have minimal integration of
the guaranteed income into a wider scheme of
income and social benefits, imply that the remedy
to poverty is simply individual and fiscal; struc-

tural remedies are not necessarily envisioned or
encompassed. But a guaranteed income, alone,
cannot redress or alter structural problems responsible for poverty and disempowerment in
Canadian society.
Moreover, the most simple guaranteed income
proposals implicitly cast citizenship primarily in
terms of the citizen as consumer, empowered by
that citizenship to purchase social welfare needs
in the market. This is consistent with what one
commentator calls “elite neo-liberalism,” focusing
on the “individual liberties of a mass consumerist society.”60 Public expectations about what
ought to be collectively provided are decreased
accordingly, and community is corroded.61
Social welfare goods cannot be provided adequately by the private market alone. Many such
goods require collective, public provision — like
medical care, social insurance, education, child
care, social housing, and so on. No matter how
adequate a guaranteed income is, there will still
be services and goods that individuals will need
— and that any just society would not see them
go without — that income spent in the private
market cannot guarantee.62
The idea that economic and social needs can
be best met by a universally established guaranteed income that delivers (roughly) the same
amount to everyone also ignores that some individuals and groups have significantly different
and more extensive needs, and ought therefore
to have greater and different entitlements than
would be provided by a standard universal benefit.63 For example, a universal and fixed grant for
health care would over-insure some and underinsure others. Reform to the welfare state must
recognize that key areas of human welfare require more that equal allotments of cash.

Women
There is a gendered face to poverty. Women rely
significantly more than men upon a variety of state
provided income and social assistance programs.

Moreover, the issues of work and income that a
guaranteed income invokes have strong relevance
for women, given gender stereotypes and norms
that structure the division of labour in Canadian
society in ways that disadvantage women.
A guaranteed income may be an attractive policy
for women whose caregiving work is undervalued
and not economically supported. However, it may
also threaten to reinforce the gendered division of
labour, making it more difficult for women to choose
the mix of unpaid caregiving and labour market
employment that is individually optimal. Simply
assuming that it is ideal for women to be free to
choose to do unpaid caregiving work ignores the
positive aspects of choosing not to do such work.
It too often understates the critical role paid work
plays in social inclusion and community building
for individual women. Women risk not being able
to assert the desire to work outside of the home
once an income is available that economically allows them to stay out of the paid labour force.
Simply put, a guaranteed income might result
in further institutionalization of women’s location
within the family—the “domestic labour trap,”64
reinforcing the gendered division of labour in the
family and eroding women’s access to the job market and careers. The result is a failure to liberate
women from the very social assumptions and hierarchy that construct the domestic characterization and devaluation of women’s work in the first
place.65 A guaranteed income may mean an increase
in leisure and self-development opportunities for
some, but it is unlikely that those individuals will
be mothers with young children.
In sum, the worry is that some versions of
guaranteed income lend support, perhaps unknowingly or unintentionally, to the gendered
division of labour, an under-emphasis on public citizenship and substantive equality, and a
shrinking of public service provision. There is
much that is libratory in aspirations of liberal
economic individualism and the formal equality
that underpins it, but one also must be cautious
to avoid promoting such an ideal uncritically.
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Political Strategies and Feasibility
We turn now to the issues of political saleability
and feasibility — the pragmatic considerations of
bringing about an actual and adequate guaranteed income program in Canada. Largely, these
are issues of political power, and in particular
what vision of the Canadian welfare state will be
supported by those elected to govern.
We are at an interesting moment: what is politically possible may be shifting. The discrediting of free market economics and growing sensitivity to the environmental disaster that lurks
around the corner have recast public perceptions
of what we must expect from government. And
Canadians, according to a number of studies,
want poverty addressed with clear and effective
government policies for poverty reduction.66 That
said, political hurdles remain.
As discussed above, the political resonances
of certain versions of guaranteed income with
neoliberalism and traditional gendered notions
of labour should make us cautious. Compromise in implementation of any program is inevitable, and we must be wary of what this might
mean for a guaranteed income in practice. This
results in a number of specific issues of pragmatic concern.
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Benefit Level
Because it will be difficult to sell the idea of a
guaranteed income that grants a truly adequate
income, for the reasons of cost and reciprocity
discussed above, the amount of the benefit is likely
to be subject to political compromise. This risks
what Ackerman and Alstott have characterized
as the “chump change” problem — that benefits
under any guaranteed income that is politically feasible will be inadequate and ineffective in
bringing about real change.67 The problem of
poverty will be touted as having been fixed, but
the reality will be that the poor will be less visible or credible as objects of political concern and
attention. We must be careful not to lose sight
of the motivating goal—the alleviation and, ultimately, elimination of poverty.

Gradual Implementation
Many thoughtful proponents of a guaranteed
income see a strategy of gradual implementation — an initially modest but universal guaranteed income whose benefit level grows as the
public gets used to the idea — as answer to the
tricky issue of cost.68 But a limited version of

guaranteed income could very well justify ongoing or even accelerated dismantling of other
social welfare programs. Already existing publicly provided income security benefits might
be folded into the guaranteed income, and publicly provided goods and services (such as childcare) might lose political viability. The outcome
could be the worst of both worlds: an inadequate
guaranteed income, and reduction or continued
non-provision of many other aspects of the social welfare state.
Another variant of staged, partial implementation involves compromising the notion of universality. Guaranteed incomes could be granted
to different select groups of individuals in need.
Such a program of guaranteed income would
not be universal to all adults, say, but would be
unconditionally guaranteed to those members
of some designated sub-group of the population. Canada’s current Old Age Security plan is

an example of such a more selective but unconditional income security program. The Child
Tax Benefit, introduced in 1984, was at one time
touted as the seed for an eventual form of guaranteed income for families with children. And
some form of guaranteed income for persons
with disabilities circulates in and out of various
current policy discussions.
Not surprisingly, those welfare recipients
deemed most “undeserving” — single, employable adults without children — do not feature
largely in proposals for more limited versions of a
guaranteed income. And this fact highlights the
danger that the rhetoric and justifications for a
guaranteed income could be used to reinforce,
rather than dismantle, the punitive and damaging stereotypes already in play in existing welfare programs about who deserves public support and who does not. The needs of only some
of the poor will appear to merit attention.
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Conclusion
This paper has illustrated some of the promise,
complexity, and challenges of the guaranteed
income model, drawing on specific proposals
and longstanding debates as they have unfolded
in Canada and elsewhere. Looking ahead, what
conclusions should be drawn about guaranteed
income in Canada for those concerned about
economic security and social justice?
We began this research with disagreement
between the two of us. Yet, interestingly, as the
project has progressed our opinions have come
closer together. We both share similar concerns
about the dangers and challenges of practical implementation of a guaranteed income program.
We both recognize strongly the inadequacy of
reform to income and social security that includes only a guaranteed income and neglects
other forms of collective provision of public
goods. And we both agree that discussion of a
guaranteed income is a fruitful exercise and an
important element of the public debate over the
future of income security.
Differences do remain. Mulvale is an advocate of eventual implementation of a guaranteed
income. He remains engaged with the task of
strategizing on how to modify income security
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arrangements in Canada in incremental, feasible, and carefully considered steps. He notes
that the collapse of neo-liberalism in the current
global economic crisis has also led to the transfer of billions of dollars of public money from
governments to large corporations. So, Mulvale
argues, citizens and social justice advocates can
legitimately ask the question: “If governments
are willing to go to such dramatic lengths to bail
out General Motors and other huge companies,
what should our elected representatives be doing to ensure the economic survival of average
working families and economically vulnerable
citizens?” He argues for nurturing the current
shift in public consciousness brought about by
the weakening of neo-liberalism, the willingness of governments to transfer wealth (at least
to large corporations), and the ecological imperative to lower consumption and to achieve
environmental sustainability.
Young remains more convinced that welfare
reform is better served by a mix of programs
for income support, labour policy, and public
goods. No doubt, in an ideal world calling for a
pure and strong guaranteed income, paired with
state provision of key public goods and other tar-

geted income benefits, along with labour market
policy reform, might be clearly best. But that is
not the world we inhabit. Thus, Young argues
that enhanced social assistance—incorporating
significant improvements to benefit levels and
eligibility, in combination with important public goods and labour market reforms, is a more
strategic and potentially effective set of poverty
reduction goals.
Nonetheless, the notion of a guaranteed income functions for Young as a timely and important reminder of what must necessarily be a
basic aspiration of any income security reform.
Mulvale concurs. Guaranteed income security,
justified by many of the reasons set out above,
can be understood as a goal to be realized by a
combination of different policies, legal reforms,
and government programs. It need not necessarily stake an urgent claim to a specific, concrete
program. It can inspire and catalyze a variety of
other reforms that together offer a complex matrix of income security.
So in the short to middle term, in any case,
we agree. It is best to work to achieve a stronger and more generous version of our current
“mixed welfare” model of income security that
would more strongly align with principles such
as universality, unconditionality, and adequacy.
And, it is important to work for other social justice reforms as well.
Such reform efforts should be based upon a
broad understanding of poverty. Poverty is more
than a simple lack of financial resources. To be
sure, absence of money is an essential characteristic of poverty and distinguishes it from other
circumstances of low levels of well-being. But
poverty is also marked by social exclusion, and
by inadequate access to public goods, community networks and resources, and political capital. This fuller notion of poverty is well-accepted;
for example, various United Nations documents
speak of poverty as limited opportunities for
well-being, covering such things as being adequately fed, clothed and sheltered, taking part

in the civil, social and political life of a community, having meaningful employment opportunities, and having affordable housing.69 Quebec’s
anti-poverty legislation, An act to combat poverty and social exclusion, defines poverty as “the
condition of a human being who is deprived of
the resources, means, choices and power necessary to acquire and maintain economic selfsufficiency or to facilitate integration and participation in society.”70
With this understanding of poverty in mind,
we both agree there are key elements of reform
that must be in any program of income security, regardless of whether a guaranteed income is
also part of the package. First, we need to strive
for the continued and enhanced collective provision of essential goods — goods and services
that everyone should be able to access. These are
things such as education, health care, childcare,
and so on. These goods are best provided universally by government. Without the base of such a
well-developed welfare state, people will remain
in need, despite guaranteed income grants.
Second, labour market policy reform is critical,
especially for those most vulnerable in the paid
labour market, such as women. The issues of precarious work and workplace justice must be part
of any program of income security advocacy. This
will require such things as a higher and adequate
minimum wage, better paid care-giving leave for
days when children and other family members
are sick, flexible hours of work, and adequate maternity and parental leave support.
Third, any reform must include ready access
to universal, affordable, and high quality early
childhood education and care that is available as
a public service. Along with good employment
policies, universal childcare will significantly
enable many of the poor to leave their poverty behind. This reform is essential to women’s
equality in particular.
Finally, as the above three points illustrate,
it is unlikely that any one single social program
can provide the full range of services and income

Possibilities and Prospec ts: The debate over a Guar anteed Income

31

support that our society ought to guarantee. A
guaranteed income alone cannot satisfy the full
scope of collective and public responsibility a
just society bears for the welfare of its population. Proponents of a guaranteed income should
be cautious about too singular a focus in their
welfare reform urgings.
Nonetheless, discussion of a guaranteed income is certainly valuable to any full debate over
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income security reform. It is evocative of what a
just and fair society must guarantee to everyone:
an adequate degree of unconditional economic
independence and empowerment. We may disagree as to the priority and form such recognition
should take. However, the debate over a guaranteed
income is critically taken up, if only to remind us
of some of the key necessary ingredients of economic security for all people in Canada.
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